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PREDATED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ISSUED IN
ABSENCE OF A BINDER-AN INSURANCE VOID
In Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co.,' the Supreme Court of
Illinois decided the seemingly narrow issue of whether one John
Mimms was an insured motorist at the time of his accident with2
plaintiff's decedent. The court held that in the absence of a binder
the insurer had properly rescinded a predated policy issued after
the accident. Mimms was, therefore, an uninsured motorist.3 This
decision was reached after the court focused on the good faith required of a party applying for insurance and found that Mimms
had not fulfilled his absolute duty of disclosing the accident to his
insurer during the pendency of his application for immediate coverage.
Two mutually exclusive contract theories were advanced in this
case. The majority based its decision on the "continuing representation" theory. The veracity of representations entered on the application are said to continue throughout the application period.
If one of the representations changes, and the insured fails to disclose the change, the insurer is not bound by a predated policy it
issues based on the representations contained in the application.
The minority took a totally different view. The two dissenting
justices theorized that the company should be liable when it accepts an application for predated coverage and issues a policy bearing the predate. This is the "assumption of the risk" theory. The
company is said to assume the risk of any interim changes since the
validity of the policy is judged as of the application date "by re4
lation. ,,
After examining the nature of concealments in insurance negotiations, this Note will analyze the Carrollcase in light of the conflicting contract theories offered. An effort will be made to determine if either legal theory adequately protects the interests of
all parties and solves the dilemma presented by an application for
immediate automobile liability insurance when apparently no
binder has been issued.
FACTS
On Friday, June 22nd at 5:00 p.m., Mimms completed an application to Adams Mutual Insurance Company for automobile lia1. 34 Ill.2d 310, 215 N.E.2d 801 (1966).
2. "The memorandum of an agreement for insurance intended to give
temporary protection pending investigation of the risk and issuance of a
formal policy." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
3. 34 I11.2d at 316, 215 N.E.2d at 804.
4. Id. at 318, 215 N.E.2d at 805 (dissenting opinion).
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bility insurance at the Iberra Insurance Agency applying for coverage commencing at 12:01 a.m. on June 22nd. Mimms made a
true representation that he not had an accident during the preceding thirty-six months. The application was mailed to Adams
on June 22nd. They received it on Monday, June 25th. The application was processed and approved by one Van Gundy, vice president of Adams, and on Tuesday, June 26th, policy No. 26187 was
mailed to Iberra bearing an effective date-time of June 22nd, 12:01
a.m. At 10:00 p.m., June 22nd, however, the plaintiff's husband
was fatally injured in a collision with Mimms. Van Gundy testified that he personally became aware of the accident on June 27th
and immediately sent an employee to retrieve the policy from
berra. The employee was successful. 5 On June 28th Adams voided
the policy and erased the entry from its books. The reason given
for this action was that Van Gundy had made a "mistake."6 Adams
evidently 7 denied any liability for damages which might naturally
arise from Mimms' accident with plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff,
therefore, instituted this declaratory judgment' action claiming
coverage under the uninsured motorist provision (Coverage "U") 9
in her husband's policy with defendant-Preferred Risk. Defendant
raised the defense that Mimms was insured and plaintiff should
look to Adams for recovery. Basing its decision on the continuing
representation theory, the court affirmed the two lower court decisions10 that Mimms was an uninsured motorist.
5. It should be noted that the mailing of the policy to the agent,
Iberra, would be effective as either a constructive or actual delivery to
the insured. This would be so regardless of whether Iberra was the agent
of the insurer or the insured. For a detailed analysis of the cases on this
point see generally Annot., 145 A.L.R. 1447 (1943).
6. Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App.2d 170, 177, 208
N.E.2d 836, 840 (1965).
7. The facts in this case are not clear. Mimms, Adams and Iberra
were not joined as parties to the action. The Abstract of Record reflects,
inter alia, Van Gundy's testimony, and a deposition by Mimms wherein he
stated he thought he had liability coverage at the time of the accident. See
Abstract of Record pp. 8-14, Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 34 IUl.2d 310,
215 N.E.2d 801 (1966). Despite the absence of these parties, and the inconclusive state of the record, the court declared that Mimms was an uninsured motorist. In light of the absolute duty of disclosure imposed on
the applicant, Mimms, it is a reasonable conjecture that the joinder of the
absent parties would not have affected the court's final decision.
8. ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 110 (Smith-Hurd 1965).
9. The pertinent sections of plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage
with defendant reads as follows:
Protection Against Uninsured Motorists Coverage U-Bodily Injury
Benefit: To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury
. . .sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out
of ... use of such uninsured automobile. .

.

. "Insured automo-

bile" means an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is no bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident....
10. 60 Ill. App.2d 170, 208 N.E.2d 836 (1965).
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NOTES
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

The parties to insurance policies do not deal at arms length.
Because of the contingent nature of insurance, the essence of the
contractual atmosphere is found in the maxim uberrimae fidei, n
that is, the utmost good faith. This is the theoretical standard.
In practice, to effect the purpose of insurance the parties are expected to fulfill their respective duties: the prospective insured
must disclose all material facts to facilitate the insurer's evaluation
of the risk; the insurer must not mislead the insured and should
stand behind the policy after issuance and when the risk attaches.
State legislatures have enacted insurance laws in an attempt to set
the standards of administration and conduct applicable to insurance companies. 12 The burden of defining the insureds' good faith
standards of disclosure, however, has been placed mainly on the
courts. In the final analysis, the courts also have the responsibilities of protecting the interests of each of the parties while at
the same time protecting the law which dictates the standards to
which each party must conform. In the area of concealments, the
task has not been easy and the standards to be gleaned from case
law are not well defined. As in Carroll, each particular type and
purpose of insurance contract has presented a problem of fusing
the doctrine of uberrimae fidei with the practical demands of the
11. Ex Parte Porter, 122 So.2d 119 (Ala. 1960), quoting BLACK, LAW
DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951):
The most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or
openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight. A phrase used to express the perfect good
faith concealing nothing, with which a contract must be made; for
example, in the case of insurance, the insured must observe the
most perfect good faith towards the insurer.
122 So.2d at 124.
12. ALA. CODE tit. 28 (1958); A~iz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 66 (1957); CAL. INS. CODE; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 72 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 (1953); D.C.
CODE ANN. tit. 35 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. tit.
56 (1960); HAWAII REV. LAWS Ch. 181 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. tit. 41 (1961);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 39 (1952);
IOWA CODE ANN. tit. 20 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 40 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. cc. 295-304 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. tit. 22 (1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 24 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175
(1958); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANNT. cc. 60-68 (1946);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 5616-5834-14 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. cc. 374-81 (1952);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 40 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 44 (1960); NEV.
REV. STAT. tit. 57 (1931); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, cc. 400-20 (1955);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:17-17:50 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 58 (1962); N.Y.
INS. LAW; N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 58 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 26 (1960);
OHmO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 39 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36
(1958); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 56, cc. 736-50 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 (1955);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 27 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 37 (1962); S.D. CODE
tit. 31 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. tit 56 (1955); TEX. INS. CODE (1963); UTAH
CODE ANN. tit. 31 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, cc. 101-27 (1958); VA. CODE
ANN. tit. 38 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. tit. 48 (1961); W.VA. CODE ANN.
ch. 33 (1966); Wis. STAT. CC. 200-10 (1959); Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 (1959).
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market place. Before analyzing the Carroll decision, therefore, it
would be helpful to evaluate the origin, the present state of the
law, and the exceptions to concealments in insurance negotiations.
The landmark case defining the nature and extent of the insured's disclosure obligations is Carter v. Boehm.' 3 Lord Mansfield's reasoning in that case outlined a general test to be applied
when the insurer raises the defense of concealment. "1. The insured (when the application was made or when the contract was
consummated) knew fact X. 2. The insurer did not know fact X.
3. Fact X was material. 1 4 If this test was met then the insurer
could avoid liability under the policy on the grounds of concealment. It was not important that the applicant acted in good faith
in evaluating either the materiality of the fact concealed or the reasons for witholding the fact. In essence, the applicant had an absolute duty of disclosure.
Although the suppression should happen through mistake,
without any fraudulent intention; yet still the underwriter
is deceived, and the policy is void; because the risque run
is really different from the risque understood and intended
to be run, at the time of the agreement. 15
The reasoning in Carter found practical application in eighteenth century marine insurance. Several pertinent reasons have
been advanced to explain this result. Information concerning the
risk was generally exclusively within the knowledge of the insured.
The informal methods of negotiating the insurance required that
the insured come forth with all the facts. Economically, the marine
insurance establishment needed protection.'" Thus evolved the
"marine rule"'-, which has been consistently applied in marine insurance cases.
For reasons generally converse to the above, the American
courts have applied to other forms of insurance what is known as
the "ordinary rule."' 8 In effect, this rule requires that an additional factor be considered before the insurer can avoid a policy
on the grounds of concealment: the insured knew fact X was material and he knew that the insurer did not know fact X. The judicial application of the ordinary rule was apparently inevitable.
The growth of insurance companies and the use of self-serving ad13.

3 Burr 1905, 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (1766).

14.

PATERSON, INSURANCE §

87 (2d ed. 1957).

Professor Patterson notes

that for practical purposes this test may be called the "Marine Rule."
See infra note 17.
15. 3 Burr at 1909, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163.

16. See GOLDIN, THE LAW OF INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 2 (2d ed.
1946); PATrERSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at §§ 87-88; VANCE, INSURANCE

§§ 8-11, 96-98 (2d ed. 1930).
17. For an extensive discussion differentiating between concealments
in marine and non-marine insurance cases -see Stecker v. American Home
Fire Assur. Co., 299 N.Y. 1, 84 N.E.2d 797,(1949).
18. Ibid.
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hesion contracts prompted the courts to protect the insured.10 Facts
not asked on the detailed applications customarily used by insurers
are generally construed as not being material,'2 unless palpably
SO. 2 1 Thus, courts distinguish between representations and concealments. Whereas a majority of courts hold that a material representation voids a policy merely by being false,2" 2 or by increasing
the risk of loss, 2 3 most courts require that the insurer prove a

fraudulent concealment in order to effectively raise the defense of
nondisclosure.24 Additionally, certain embarrassing facts, 2 5 or those

19. "The general law of contracts has been considerably distorted by
American courts in applying it to insurance controversies, because they have
sought to protect the insured." PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 11.
The insurance companies cannot be condemned for resorting to mass produced contracts designed to expedite the actual transactions and to set out
the terms of the policy. The result is unfortunate, however, since the adhesion contract stifles freedom of contract and places the insured at a disadvantage. See Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43
COL. L. REV. 731 (1943). For a historic development of the courts balancing
the relative interests of the parties see Kimball, The Role of the Court in
the Development of Insurance Law, 57 Wis. L. REV. 521 (1957).
20. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
72 Fed. 413 (6th Cir. 1896). The application is said to "cover the field" of
those items deemed material by the insurer.
21. Ibid.
22. See Billington v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 254 F.2d 428 (8th
Cir. 1958); M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 243 F. Supp. 806 (W.D. Ark.
1965); San Francisco Lathing Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 Cal. App.2d
66, 300 P.2d 715 (1956); Gilham v. Nat'l Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App.
459, 122 S.E.2d 164 (1961); Mills v. Reserve Life Ins. Co. 335 S.W.2d 955 (Ky.
1960); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 212 Md. 202, 129 A.2d 103 (1957);
Hahman v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App. 1961); Swartzberg v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 252 N.C. 150, 113 S.E.2d 270 (1960); Chitwood
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 206 Va. 314, 143 S.E.2d 915 (1965); Christian v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 144 W. Va. 746, 110 S.E.2d 845 (1959).
Courts requiring falseness and reliance by insurer: Merchants Indem. Corp.,
v. Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 172 A.2d 206 (1961); Adams v. National
Cas. Co., 307 P.2d 542 (Okla. 1957).
23. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gourley, 267 F.2d 156 (8th Cir.
1959); World Ins. Co. v. Pipes, 255 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1958) (applying law of
Louisiana); Campbell v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 15 Ill.2d 308, 198 N.E.2d
630 (1950); Kaufman v. National Cas. Co., 342 Mass. 412, 174 N.E.2d 35
(1961); Taylor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 106 N.H. 455, 214 A.2d 109 (1965).
Courts requiring the representation to be false and fraudulent: Harris v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1956) (applying the
law of Tennessee); Vackiner v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 Neb. 300,
137 N.W.2d 859 (1965); Beacon Mut. Indem. Co. v. Galliher, 88 Ohio L. Abs.
21, 181 N.E.2d 292 (1961); Schleifer v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 421 Pa. 359,
219 A.2d 692 (1966); Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205,
407 P.2d 685 (1965). Courts requiring the representation to be false, fraudulent and reliance by the insurer: Bernadich v. Bernadich, 287 Mich. 137,
283 N.W. 5 (1938); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Bates, 213 S.C. 269, 49 S.E.
2d 201 (1948).
24. See American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoples Compress Co., 156 F.2d
663 (10th Cir. 1946) (applying the law of Oklahoma); Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co. v. Colorado Leasing, Min. & Mill. Co.,.50 Colo. 424, 116 Pac. 154 (1911);
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Hoxie, 129 Fla. 332, 176 So. 480 (1937);
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affecting the moral hazard only, 26 have been held to be properly
concealed from the insurer, although if they had been disclosed undoubtedly no policy would have been issued.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that in most
27
American jurisdictions the insured need only act in good faith
as to facts he withholds from the insurer. The mere nondisclosure
of material facts is not dispositive in all cases. This is especially
true where changes to the risk occur after the application is completed but before a policy is issued. In Orto v. Poggioni28 an
employer had consulted with a broker concerning compensation insurance and assumed he had coverage. An accident occured at
11:30 a.m. Five hours later, in ignorance of the accident, the broker
secured the policy which was predated to include the time of the
accident. Although the employer did not immediately disclose the
accident to the insurer, the court held that the insured had acted
reasonably under the circumstances and the policy would not be
voided on the grounds of concealment. Again, in Points v. Wills, 2
where the insured failed to notify the company of an accident
which occurred during the application period, the court upheld the
predated policy although the agent who received the insured's application for immediate coverage did not have actual authority to
bind the company. Instead of focusing on the nondisclosure, the
court emphasized the insured's good faith reliance on the agent's
Gilham v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 459, 122 S.E.2d 164
(1961); Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Whitley, 252 Ky. 360, 185 S.W. 1136 (1933); Phenix Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 53 Neb. 811, 74 N.W. 269 (1898); Fadden v. Pheonix
Ins. Co., 77 N.H. 392, 92 AtI. 335 (1914); Merchant Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston,
68 N.J. Super. 235, 179 A.2d 505 (1961); Points v. Wills, 44 N.M. 31, 97 P.2d
374 (1939); Stecker v. American Home Fire Assur. Co., 299 N.Y. 1, 84 N.E.2d
797 (1949); Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 108, 132 S.E.2d 273 (1963);
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Nash, 67 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Sanford
v. Royal Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 653, 40 Pac. 609 (1895); Emmco Ins. Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co., 263 Wis. 558, 58 N.W.2d 525 (1953). Contra, Ex Parte Porter,
271 Ala. 44, 122 So.2d 119 (1960); Newman v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 67 Cal.
App.2d 386, 154 P.2d 451 (1945); Arthur v. Palatine Ins. Co., 35 Ore. 27, 57
Pac. 62 (1899); All Am. Life & Cas. Co. v. Krenzelok, 409 P.2d 766 (Wyo.
1966).
: 25. Merriman v. Grand Lodge Deg. of Honor, 77 Neb. 544, 110 N.W.
302 (1906) (pregnancy); Mallory v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 N.Y. 52, 7 Am. Rep.
410 (1871) (previous insanity); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson,
146
589, 244
S.W. 44 (1922) (excessive drinking).
, Tenn.
26. E.g.,
Orent
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 268 App. Div. 299, 51
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1944) (insured did not disclose that the federal penitentiary
was a previous home address).
27. Honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. An honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
render the transaction unconscientious.
BLACK, LAW DIcTioNARY (4th ed. 1951). The same standard is, of course,
applicable to the insurer.
28. 245 App. Div. 782, 281,N.Y.S. 16'(1935).
29. 44 N.M. 31, 97P.2d 374 (1939).
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apparent authority to bind the risk. In other cases, however, where
the nondisclosure is tainted with fraud on the application or during
the interim period, the courts are quick to condemn the insured's
actions and to allow recission. 0
The increasing tendency of the courts to construe in favor of
the insured ambiguities in the application3 ' or policy,32 together33
with a willingness to effect the purpose of the insurance contract,
has caused some courts to ignore or dismiss an inquiry into the insured's non-disclosure.3 4 No court would sanction an overt fraud,
as for example not disclosing an accident which occurred before an
application, but included within a predated policy.35 In the absence of fraud, however, it would appear that a majority of courts
are willing to interpret the insured's good faith duties
of disclosure
36
in light of the circumstances of each particular case.
CONTINUING REPRESENTATIONS V. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
The Carroll court strictly construed the insured's good faith
30. See, e.g., Broome v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 152 So.2d 827
(La. App. 1963) (Husband had accident and called wife, but claimed he did
not inform her of accident. Wife later that day obtained predated insurance); Moore v. American Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 174 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) (Agent of insurer obtained life policy on his daughter, who
died within ten days. Agent claimed he was not aware of daughter's
serious illness); Forrester v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 43 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) (Applicant died two months after policy issued, of cancer of cervix. The nondisclosure of an interim trip to Mayo Clinic held to void
policy).
31. See, e.g., Metts v. Central Standard Life Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App.2d
445, 298 P.2d 621 (1956) (wording on back of application construed to provide
immediate coverage); Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420,
274 P.2d 633 (1954) ("An application must be construed as it would be taken
by the ordinary applicant ..
") Id. at 425, 274 P.2d at 636 (dictum).
32. See, e.g., Minzenberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super.
557, 43 A.2d 377 (1945) (the court distinguished a provision in the policy as
not pertaining to a continuing representation); Burdick v. California Ins.
Co., 50 Idaho 327, 295 Pac. 1005 (1931) (ambiguity as to effective date of
the policy).
33. See, e.g., Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 108 Ga. App. 60, 131 S.E.2d
834 (1963) (automobile insurance); Jackson v. County Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Ill.
App.2d 300, 190 N.E.2d 490 (1963) (medical insurance); Tennant v. Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection Ins. Co., 351 Pa. 102, 40 A.2d 385 (1944) (indemnity
insurance); Davis v. North Am. Acc. Ins. Co., 42 Wash.2d 291, 254 P.2d 722
(1953) (accident insurance). See also 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 297 (1945),
listing thirty states declaring a liberal construction of policies to effect
their purposes.
34. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hub Hosiery Mills, 74 F. Supp. 599 (D.
Mass. 1947); Barry v. Aetna Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 183, 81 A.2d 551 (1951);
Allience Ins. Co. v. Continental Gin Co., 285 S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
35. See generally Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1325 (1941).
36. One of the circumstances often considered by the courts is the
rights of third parties who would be affected by the court's decision to
allow avoidance of the policy in question. This is particularly true in
cases involving liability policies. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Granite
Trucking Co., 296 Mass. 149, 4 N.E.2d 809 (1935).
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obligations. In essence, an absolute duty of disclosing material
changes affecting the risk was imposed on the insured. Without
inquiring into all the facts concerning the conctractual relations
among Mimms, Iberra, and Adams, the court utilized one test to
measure the applicant's good faith: did the applicant reveal the
accident to the insurer? In answering its test the court stated:
Insurance policies have traditionally called for good faith,
openness and candor on the prospective insured's part, and
to reduce this standard would seriously alter and disrupt
the purpose of insurance. Since we believe that the trial
court could find from the record that the prospective insured, John Mimms, failed to apprise Adams Mutual of the
fatal collision, the refusal 3to7 grant Mimms retrospective
coverage was legally proper.
To justify Mimms' absolute duty of disclosing his accident, the
Carroll court reasoned that the representations he entered on his
predated application continued until the application was processed
by the company and a policy issued." It is submitted that such
37.

Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 34 Ill.2d at 314, 215 N.E.2d at

803.
38. Ibid. In support of the continuing representation theory the court
cited Strangio v. Consolidated Indem. & Co., 66 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1933).
That case was decided on the basis of the California Civil Code § 2562
(1930) which provides in part: "A concealment, whether intentional or
unintentional, entitles the injured party to rescind a contract of insurance."
Illinois does not have a comparable statutory provision, nor is this thinking
in line with a majority of jurisdictions. See cases cited supra note 24.
The leading case applying the continuing representation rule to other
than marine insurance is Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311
(1928), cited by both Carroll and Strangio. That case concerned a "delivery in good health" clause in a life insurance contract. Such a clause is
normally construed as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
policy when it is issued at the time of delivery. The clause, or condition
precedent, is not unlike the marine insurance common law rule that the
completion of the contract is the time to which a representation must refer.
The latter rule is merely another way of explaining the insured's absolute
duty to disclose any material changes to the marine insurer. The better
reasoned opinions of the courts following Stipcich have noted that the continuing representation rule applies to contracts of insurance containing a
condition precedent similar to the "delivery in good health" clause. This
clause puts the insured on notice that he must disclose material changes at
his peril of having the contract avoided. See, e.g., Coomgs v. Equitable
Life Ins. Co., 120 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1941); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay,
36 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1929). But see Forrester v. Southland Life Ins. Co.,
43 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (continuing representation rule applied
although no "delivery in good health" clause). When a contract does not
contain an explicit condition precedent, making the contract effective only
if the representations are the same on the date of issuance as on the application date, the better rule would seem to be that the insurer must prove a
fraudulent concealment of interim changes. For a discussion of the continuing representation rule not being applied by modern courts, see PATTERSON, INSURANCE § 82 (2d ed. 1957).
But see Harnett, The Doctrine of
Concealment: A Remnant in the Law of Insurance, 15 LAW & CONrEMP.
PROB. 391 (1950).
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reasoning is not only an unnecessary legal fiction but has the effect of blurring the true standard of good faith which should be applied. The continuing representation concept does not distinguish,
either in meaning or effect, between a concealment and a misrepresentation. If the applicant's representations are judged as of the
time the policy is issued, and a change has occurred, the logical
conclusion of the above concept is to make the representations into
misrepresentations. In effect, then, the applicant is said to be misrepresenting the facts rather than concealing a change in them. But
there is a significant legal distinction between a concealment and a
misrepresentation.
The distinction becomes important in the United States,
at least, because of the differing rules that apply to representations and concealments. A material misrepresentation, though wholly innocent, avoids the contract, but a material nondisclosure invalidates the contract only if made
in bad faith. Therefore, if any material change takes place
between the date of the application and the completion of
the contract which renders a representation made in the
application no longer true, the policy will be wholly
avoided, irrespective of the intent of the insured, if it be
considered that the representation is made as of the date
of the completion of the contract; whereas if the nondisclosure of an intervening event is to be regarded merely as
only if such
a concealment, the contract will be3 invalidated
9
concealment was made in bad faith.
The continuing representation theory is consistently applied
only in marine insurance cases. It is to be noted, however, that
any concealment, whether intentional or not, will avoid a marine
policy. In other forms of insurance, consideration is given to the intent of the insured in failing to disclose a material change to the
risk. For this reason the continuing representation rule has been
criticized by some writers as being the wrong measure by which
to test the insured's conduct. The rule was placed in its proper
perspective by the court in Armond v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.40
The court rejected the continuing representation theory, stating:
The fact is that the statements in the application were all

true, and they did not automatically become false by subsequent developments, unless at the time of delivery the
questionnaire was presented to the insured by the company's agent for a recheck of the accuracy of the answers
and was reaffirmed by the applicant. There did exist, however, a duty to disclose material and serious changes in his
physical condition arising subsequent to his application,

duty would be a fraud
and a deliberate violation of 4this
1
which would vitiate the policy.
39. VANCE, INsURANcE §§ 381-82 (2d ed. 1930).
40. 134 Misc. 357, 235 N.Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
41. Id. at 361, 235 N.Y.S. at 728. See also Zoch v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 117 N.J.L. 295, 187 Atl. 777 (1936); Mizenberg v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super. 557, 43 A.2d 377 (1945).
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It is true that the insured is put on notice as to the materiality
of any question contained in the application. The intent of the
insured, however, is a question of fact to be determined from all
the circumstances in each case.
The circumstances reported in Carroll do not indicate that the
insured acted fraudulently or did not use reasonable diligence to
reveal the accident. ft has been held that the mere nondisclosure
of an interim accident is not conclusive evidence of fraud.4 2 When
the insured is physically unable to disclose an accident 4 or he
reasonably believes that he is covered by interim insurance, 4 his
failure to disclose a material change in the risk is legally excusable.
Predated policies cannot be avoided merely because the insurer was
unaware of the material change. By failing to join Mimms as a
party to the action, the court was unable to determine whether
there was evidence tending to prove that Mimms would be relieved
of his duty to disclose the accident because of impossibility or reasonable belief that he had interim coverage.
42. Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. D.A. Swanstrom Co., 203 Minn. 68, 279
N.W. 845 (1938).
43. Canadian Indem. Co. v. Tacke, 257 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958) (unconscious applicant relieved of duty to disclose accident to his agent). But
cf., Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. McElroy, 83 Fed. 631 (8th Cir. 1897)
(interim appendix operation required to be disclosed although applicant in
hospital at time policy issued). In non-marine cases the applicant-insured
is not required to disclose interim changes at his peril. His good faith duty
of disclosing is satisfied by the exercise of "due diligence." Few cases were
found concerning physical impossibility as relieving the duty to disclose.
It is suggested, however, that an analogy can be made to the cases construing the condition subsequent frequently found in insurance policies,
that the insured must give notice of an accident within a reasonable (or
immediate) time after the accident In such cases the insured is also required to only exercise "due diligence." The courts consistently hold that a
physical impossibility of giving notice of the accident will excuse the insured. See, e.g., Newborn v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 198 N.C.
156, 150 S.E. 887 (1929); Brown v. State Farm Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 233
S.C. 376, 104 S.E.2d 673 (1958); Edgefield Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
78 S.C. 73, 58 S.E. 969 (1907). Cf., Haskell v. Eagle Indem. Co., 108
Conn. 652, 144 Atl. 298 (1929); Heller v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio
St. 237, 160 N.E. 707 (1928); but cf., Sawyer v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 10 F.
Supp. 848 (E.D. Va. 1935).
44. The most obvious cases of "reasonable belief" occur where the
applicant relies on the soliciting agent's apparent authority to issue immediate coverage. See, e.g., Hughes v. Pierce, 141 So.2d 280 (Fla. App.
1961) Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 60 Ill. App. 159, aff'd, 160 Ill. 488,
43 N.E. 609 (1896); Points v. Wills, 44 N.M. 31, 97 P.2d 374 (1939); Dembitzer v. Gilliam, 44 Misc.2d 487, 254 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In other
cases the courts have merely considered all the circumstances to ascertain
whether the insured actually or probably thought he was covered when the
loss occurred, and a predated policy was subsequently issued. See, e.g.,
El Dia Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 228 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 1915) (dictum); Burdick v.
California Ins. Co., 50 Idaho 327, 295 Pac. 1005 (1931); Orto v. Poggioni,
245 App. Div. 782, 281 N.Y. Supp. (1935); Alliance Ins. Co. v. Continental
Gin Co., 285 S.W. 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
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There was no indication that the agent Iberra did not have
actual or apparent authority to make a temporary oral contract
binding on Adams. It is universally held that oral contracts of insurance are valid when the agent has authority to issue binders. 45
An applicant's reliance on an oral binder would be reasonable if
the agent appeared to have the authority to bind the risk and the
applicant was not put on notice by a statement in the application
that the agent in fact had no such authority. It would seem natural
that one applying for immediate automobile liability coverage
would ask of the agent: "Am I covered now?" If the answer had
been in the affirmative, it is suggested the court would have been
justified in finding that the agent, Iberra, had apparent authority
to orally bind the insurer. The finding of an oral binder would
then negate the insured's duty to disclose interim changes. The
insurer would be bound as though a formal policy had been immediately issued. Such a result is not unfair because the insurer
collects a premium for the interim period.
One indicia of apparent authority is the possession by a soliciting agent of the insurer's own application forms. 46 The record in
Carroll shows that Mimms applied for his insurance on an Adams
application form.4 7 The insured, then, might have been justified
in relying on the agent as an authorized agent of the insurer. The
court in Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. D. A. Swanstrom Co.,48 interpreting a situation similar to Carroll,stated:
Were insurers free to collect premiums for the period
bounded by the date of application and the date of issuance
of the policy and at the same time at liberty to repudiate all
liability for any losses occurring during that period, the
injustice of the rule would be grossly apparent. To avoid
this result and to forestall overreaching, courts have found
an implied authority in soliciting agents of insurers following this practice to contract with applicants for interim or
preliminary insurance covering the49period prior to acceptance or rejection of the application.
45. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1964); Shipman v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 232 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mo. 1964);
Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Watson-David Ins. Co., 167 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1964);
Miller v. Liberty Ins. Co., 213 A.2d 831 (Me. 1965); Glen Falls Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 403 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1965). Contra, Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Westbrook, 112 Ga. App. 137, 144 S.E.2d 199 (1965).
46. Hughes v. Pierce, 141 So.2d 280 (Fla. App. 1961) (dictum).
47. Abstract of Record pp. 9, 18, Carroll v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co.,
34 I1l.2d 310, 215 N.E.2d 801 (1966).
48. 203 Minn. 68, 279 N.W. 845 (1938).
49. Id. at 70, 279 N.W. at 846. Cf., United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Goldberger, 13 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1926); Hughes v. Pierce, 141 So.2d 280
(Fla. App. 1961); Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 160 Ill. 488, 43 N.E.
609 (1896); Boever v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 221 Iowa 566, 266 N.W. 276 (1936);
Korvisto v. Bankers & Merchants F. Ins. Co., 148 Minn. 255, 181 N.W. 580
(1921); Dembitzer v. Gilliam, 44 Misc.2d 487, 254 N.Y.S. 47 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
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It is not to be suggested from the foregoing that the Carroll
court should have strained to find that Mimms' duty of disclosure
was eliminated by reliance on the agent's apparent authority or by
a physical impossibility. Unreasonable protection should not be
afforded the insured. This is especially true in the area of interim
changes to the risk. The changes are peculiarly within the knowledge of the insured. The insurer cannot anticipate the myriad
of changes to the risk which might affect a liability policy. It is
submitted, however, that the court erred in summarily applying
the harsh continuing representation theory. All of the pertinent
parties should have been joined in the action. A full disclosure
of all the facts would have put the insured's concealment to the
test of good faith. By requiring an absolute duty of disclosure
as a matter of law, the court has set a precedent which would work
a hardship in other cases where a jury could find that the insured
did not act fraudulently.
The dissent in Carroll reasoned that the continuing representation theory was inapplicable in the setting of a predated application.
The majority overlooks the crucial difference between the
duty to notify of changed conditions under an ordinary application, and the duty that exists when predated insurance
is involved. The Supreme Court of the United States drew
this distinction in Stipcich v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 277
U.S. 311, 315, 48 S. Ct. 512, 513: "an insurer may, of course,
assume the risk of such changes in the insured's health as
may occur between the date of application and the date of
the issuance of a policy. Where the parties contract on the
basis of conditions as they existed at the date of the applicaknown
tion, the failure of the insured to divulge any later
50
changes in health may well not affect the policy."
In effect, this "assumption of the risk" theory eliminates the insured's duty of disclosing interim changes. Once the applicant fills
out the application for immediate (i.e., predated) coverage the focus is on the corresponding actions of the insurer. This theory
more closely resembles ordinary contract law than it does insurance contract law.
In the typical case the applicant submits his offer for immediate coverage and truthfully represents conditions existing at the
time the application is completed. Based on the dissent's theory,
the insurer has at least three options upon receiving the offer for
predated insurance. 1. It can reject the offer and make a counteroffer by issuing a policy dated as of the time it is issued. 2. It can
reject the offer by making a counter-offer that the policy is to be
effective only on condition that no changes have occurred during
the interim period. (This situation is common in life insurance
policies which contain "delivery in good health" clauses). 3. It
can accept the offer by issuing a predated policy thereby assuming
50. 34 Ill.2d at 318, 215 N.E.2d at 805 (dissenting opinion).
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the risk of interim losses and changes. The insurer in Carroll
manifested an intent to exercise this third option. The dissent argued that such an objective display of intent to accept the risk of
interim losses should be binding on the insurer.
The rationale of the dissent is persuasive. The insurer is well
aware that interim losses may occur. If it accepts the insured's
offer, expecting to be paid a premium for the interim period of coverage, it would appear to be illogical, and unfair to the insured,
to allow a recission of the contract when a loss occurs, The law
does allow recovery on predated policies where neither party
knows of the interim loss. 5 1 In such cases the insurer is permitted
to assume the risk of any interim losses. Therefore, why allow
avoidance of the policy when each of the parties has manifested an
intent that the contract should be based on conditions existing at
the time of the application?
The argument that the insurer should assume the risk although
the applicant has learned of an interim loss, is untenable in several
respects. To uphold such policies the law would have to condone
the intentional nondisclosure of material facts.5 2

Furthermore, it

is repugnant to the nature of insurance to allow the issuance and
acceptance of a policy when the insured knows that the risk has
already attached. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that insurance
companies would not sanction such a practice if they could not
rely on the insured to notify them of interim material changes. It
also must be noted that the dissent's argument need only be considered if in fact a policy is issued. Should the insurer or its agent
learn of the interim change, a policy providing immediate coverage
would undoubtedly not be issued.
The assumption-of-the-risk concept presents an interplay of
public policy problems. It is the responsibility of the courts to enforce the insured's duty to disclose interim changes material to the
risk. The courts are faced, however, with the practice of some companies to issue policies bearing the same date as the application.
51.

Ostroff v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 172 Pa. Super. 211,

92 A.2d 899 (1952); See generally Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1325 (1941).
52. It is generally recognized that there is no duty to disclose interim
changes material to the risk in cases of reinstatement and countersigning
applications. In reinstatement, the duty is eliminated on the basis of a
prior contract right derived from terms in the original policy. If the company accepts the application for reinsurance, the coverage relates back to
the date of the application. See, e.g., Bowie v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Higginbotham, 95 U.S. 380 (1877); See generally Annot., 164 A.L.R. 1057
(1946). In countersigning, the soliciting agent is said to have the authority
to bind the risk but the policy is not effective "unless" countersigned.
Although the insurer may disapprove the application by not countersigning, the insurer will be held liable for interim losses and there is no
inquiry into a duty to disclose interim losses or other changes. See, e.g.,
Pruitt v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 725, 86 S.E.2d 401 (1955); Barnett v.
Mutual Ins. Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (C.P. 1958); McKee v. Continental
Ins. Co., 191 Tenn. 413, 234 S.W.2d 830 (1950).
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53
This practice has been vigorously condemned by eminent writers.
The companies are collecting a premium for a period during which
the law will allow avoidance of the policy if the insured does not
in good faith reveal an interim material change. Some courts have
recognized the unfairness to the insured. Rather than focusing on
the interim nondisclosure, the courts have looked to the objective
action of the companies in issuing a predated policy.5 4 This opportunity was available in Carrollbut the court rejected it.
It would seem that the practice of predating policies, when no
binder has been issued, should be condemned. The insured is
placed in a tenuous position. If he discloses a material change the

policy may not be issued. Where the interim change is the attaching of the risk itself, the pressure is greatest to refrain from mak-

ing a good faith disclosure.

If the insured intentionally does not

disclose, the insurer has a good defense to a claim on the policy.
In either case, the insured does not obtain the desired immediate
coverage. In effect, an insurance void exists.
CONCLUSIONS
The problems presented in Carroll evidence the complexities
of a concealment which occur when a predated policy was issued
55
In Carbut no written binder was initially given to the insured.

53. E.g., 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4266 (2d ed.
1962). The author emphatically states his view:
It has been held that the insurer is entitled to cancel a predated
policy, where the insured failed to disclose an accident which occurred between the dates of application and issuance of the policy.
This result is open to censure. It appears that many companies
have fallen into the practice of pre-dating policies to the time when
the application for insurance was made. If no loss has occurred in
the interval between application and issuance of the policy, all is
well. But when such a loss has been sustained, the insurer then
attempts to wriggle out of liability on the ground that the risk has
been increased without its knowledge. It is submitted that a rule
of law which sustains this position is instrumental in perpetrating
a fraud on the insured. If the insurer dates back its policy, and
charges a premium for such a period of time, it should bear the
risk of loss occurring within the same period of time. Of course
... the insurer should be and will be protected by the courts ...
where the insured was guilty of fraudulent concealment.
See also Note, Failure of Coverage in Antedated Insurance, 34 MINN. L.
REV. 231 (1950).
54. See note 31 supra. The court in Windsor Nat'l Bank v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 703, 137 S.E. 848 (1927) emphasized the importance of the predated policy as manifesting the intent of the parties:
The rule is that, where the intention of the parties is that the contract of insurance, or the contract for reinstatement of insurance,
shall relate back to the date of the application, or to the date of
default, a change in the insurable Status of the applicant after the
application for insurance, or reinsurance, cannot vitiate the contract when actually consummated. In such cases the doctrine of
continuing representations is eliminated by the intention of the
parties as expressed by their contract.
137 S.E. at 839.
55. The issuance of a binder is not an inclusive solution. The binder
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roll, the complications were compounded by not joining all pertinent parties. The respective duties demanded by the maxim uberrimae fidei are essential in insurance negotiations, but to apply the
maxim too broadly works an injustice on the insured. The absolute
duty of disclosure, required by the continuing representation
theory, would appear to be the wrong test by which to measure
a concealment of an interim material change.
Substantial justice was attained, however, by the Carroll decision. The plaintiff could recover damages under her decedent's
uninsured motorist coverage It must be noted, however, that a
future case might involve a motorist and a pedestrian, or a second
motorist without uninsured motorist protection. In such a case a
substantial injustice would result if the insurer raised the defense
of concealment and the court allowed the policy to be avoided as
a matter of law merely because the nondisclosure concerned a representation on the application. A majority of courts would require
the insurer to show that the insured entertained a fraudulent intent before a concealment would vitiate a policy. It is submitted
that this is the better approach, especially in cases involving insureds with less business acumen than the companies. The insured
should be held to a standard of good faith which is measured by
the test of reasonableness under all the circumstances: the materiality of the fact not disclosed, the reliance of the insured on the
agent's authority, and the expectation of the insured to obtain immediate coverage when he applies for it in good faith.
The court in Carroll properly pointed out that the practice of
issuing a predated policy without a binder should be condemned.
The need for immediate automobile liability coverage, however, is
a pressing problem.56 In the absence of compulsory insurance laws,
the need is not satisfied by placing all the responsibility on the
motorist to obtain his coverage directly with a company or with an
57
agent having actual authority to issue an oral or written binder.
can be written with conditions precedent which would require interim disclosure until the conditions were fulfilled. Cf. Comment, Life Insurance
Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-Binding Binders, 63 YALE. L. J. 523
(1955); Brown, Binding Receipts and the Judiciary, 305 INs. L. J. 475
(1948).
56. See Loiseau, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 Tsx. L. REV. 154 (1959).
57. Investigation by the writer reveals that written binders for automobile liability policies may not be given to the insured as a matter of
course. Although the common intent of the agent and applicant is that
coverage is to start immediately, the insured has no written proof. He
may depend on the oral assurance of the agent that he has coverage. It
is questionable that the average applicant knows what a written binder is
or knows enough to ask for one. Thus, any ensuing dispute as to the existence of a contract, binding on the insurer, will depend upon the insured
proving an oral contract and actual or apparent authority in the agent.
It is suggested that this loose practice of not issuing a written binder
immediately upon completion of the application for insurance, should be
condemned and subject to regulation.
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Undoubtedly, the insurance companies have valid reasons for not
allowing all agents and independent solicitors to give binders. The
solution to providing the motorist with valid immediate coverage,
however, lies not in restricting the accessibility of such coverage
or in having claims turn on apparent authority.
It is surprising that state legislatures have not anticipated the
insurance void which can exist when a motorist applies for immediate coverage with an agent who lacks authority to consummate a
contract for temporary coverage. It is noted that all states have
Financial Responsibility or Safety Laws. 5s This shows an awareness of the need to have the public protected from unsafe motorists.
No state insurance law was found, however, which provides positive protection to the public from the supposedly safe driver who
requests immediate liability coverage, but who may not obtain such
coverage because the agent lacks authority to issue a binder.59
Several solutions can be suggested. Regardless of whether an
oral or written binder is issued, if the insured is an acceptable risk
at the time he applies, he should be provided interim coverage until the company objectively accepts or rejects the application. This
solution infringes somewhat on the insurer's freedom of contract.
In the light of a manifest public need, however, the insurers should
assume some responsibility for placing in the field their agents, or
independent agents, equipped with company application forms.
When the applicant is a questionable risk he should be given a
definite notice that no insurance is to be provided until the company passes on the application. The insured could be required to
sign a statement acknowledging his lack of coverage. An alternate
answer is to require that all agents who lack the authority to issue
binders use only application forms containing an obvious notice
that no interim coverage is provided merely by completing the application. 60 This does not solve the problem of providing immediate coverage but the applicant is thereby alerted of his exact uninsured status.
It would seem reasonable that a motorist who is an insurable
risk when he applies for a liability policy, should be provided with
an inclusive means of obtaining immediate coverage. Cooperation
58. For a detailed listing of state statutes see Loiseau, supra note 56,
at 157. Commenting on the relative merits of such statutes, the author
observed:
"The most notorious weakness in such a statutory scheme
[Financial Security Laws] is that it does not necessarily protect the first
victim of the irresponsible driver." Ibid.
59. The. excepted states are those having compulsory automobile liability -laws whereby proof of coverage is a condition to registering the vehicle within the state. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90 § 34A
(1958).
60. Application forms for insurance pursuant to a Financial Responsibility Law contain such a notice. It would seem that other applicants
should also be given positive notice of their lack of coverage when dealing
with agents not having actual authority to issue binders.
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is required from the insurers, the legislature, and the courts to fill
the void caused by predated policies issued without a written binder.
BARRETT

S.

HAIGHT

